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Abstract 
This paper applies a novel methodology to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the 
period 1990-2002 to assess merger control’s effectiveness. By using data gathered from 
several sources and employing different evaluation techniques, we analyze the economic 
effects of the European Commission’s (EC) merger control decisions and distinguish between 
blockings, clearances with commitments (either behavioral or structural), and outright 
clearances. We run an event study on merging and rival firms’ stocks to quantify the 
profitability effects of mergers and merger control decisions. We back up our results and 
methodology by using alternative measures for the merger’s profitability effects based on 
balance sheet data and obtain consistent results. Our findings suggest that outright blockings 
solve the competitive problems generated by the merger. Remedies are not always effective in 
solving the market power concerns, at least not on average. Nevertheless, both structural 
(divestitures) and behavioral remedies do help restore effective competition when correctly 
applied to anticompetitive mergers during the first investigation phase. Yet, they are on the 
whole ineffective or even detrimental when applied after the second investigation phase. 
Finally, remedies - especially behavioral ones - seem to constitute a rent transfer from 
merging firms to rivals when mistakenly applied to pro-competitive mergers. 
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1. Introduction 
The evaluation of the economic effects of bureaucratic or legal institutions’ decisions is both 
one of the most important but also one of the most difficult tasks in economics. When 
analyzing merger control decisions, for example, there is uncertainty about the merger effects 
per se, the impact of the antitrust authority’s decision, and the perennial problem of the proper 
counterfactual: what would have happened had the two firms not merged, what would have 
happened had the authority (not) blocked the merger or (not) ordered a particular remedy? 
Merger control institutions are often criticized: they are protectionist (Aktas et al., 2006), are 
relatively open to capture (Evans and Salinger, 2002), hinder "globalization" and hence 
technological progress (GE/Honeywell), destroy synergistic efficiencies by unnecessarily 
intervening in the market place (Aktas et al., 2004) or, on the contrary, let anticompetitive 
mergers go through. 
This paper applies a novel methodology to a unique dataset of large concentrations 
scrutinized by the European Commission (EC) during the period 1990-2002. By using data 
gathered from several sources and by employing different evaluation techniques, we avoid 
many of the ambiguities of previous studies on the effects of institutional decisions. In 
particular, we distinguish between blockings, clearances with commitments (i.e. behavioral or 
structural remedies), and outright clearances. We run an event study on merging and rival 
firms’ stocks to measure the profitability effects of mergers and merger control decisions. We 
back up our results and methodology by using alternative measures for the merger’s 
profitability effects based on balance sheet data and we obtain consistent results. Our findings 
suggest that outright blockings solve the competitive problems generated by the merger. Yet, 
remedies are not always effective in solving the market power concerns, at least not on 
average. Nevertheless, both structural (divestitures) and behavioral remedies do help restore 
effective competition when correctly applied to anticompetitive mergers during the first 
investigation phase. Yet, they are on the whole ineffective or even detrimental when applied 
in the second investigation phase. Furthermore, remedies - especially behavioral ones - seem 
to constitute a rent transfer from merging to rival firms when mistakenly applied to pro-
competitive mergers. 
 We think that an evaluation of different policy instruments’ effectiveness in merger 
control is particularly timely and necessary. While the European Commission cleared most of 
the over 3,000 notified mergers since 1990 without commitments (around 95%) as they 
presumably do not impose a threat to competition, few major mergers are completed without 
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some conditions and obligations being imposed such as divestitures, provision of access, 
termination of agreements, or other behavioral requirements. More than half of phase 2 
decisions (i.e. decisions after an in depth analysis: 75 out of 126 or 59%) are compatible only 
with commitments, yet only 19 mergers have been blocked since 1990. Moreover, there are 
significantly fewer proposed mergers blocked in recent years, following the overruling of 
three of the Commission’s blocking decisions by the European Court of Justice in recent years 
(Airtours/First Choice; Schneider/Legrand; and Tetra Laval/Sidel), which were under the 
media spotlight and triggered major institutional changes.1 These events made it essentially 
politically unfeasible for the Commission to block further mergers. Indeed, no merger was 
blocked in 2002, 2003 and 2005, and only one was blocked in 2004. 
The situation is partially comparable to the USA, where remedies have been heavily 
used in merger control decisions. In its 1998 and 1999 fiscal years, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) challenged 63 mergers; of these 41 (65%) involved negotiated 
restructurings, 18 (29%) were abandoned, and only four (6%) were litigated. Looking at the 
overall activity of the two jurisdictions, however, one observes some notable differences.2 
The European Commission was surely more “activist” between 1993 and 2002 than their 
American counterparts, with an average ratio between actions and notifications of 6.4%, 
while in the US in only 2.1 % of the notified mergers antitrust intervention was applied.3 
Nevertheless, the American authorities appear to have been much tougher than the EC when 
intervening in the last years (see figure 1). While the ratio between blocking decisions and 
notifications is on average almost equal in the two jurisdictions over the entire sample, in the 
last sample year it diverged significantly with much more blockings per notifications in the 
US than in Europe.  
[figure 1 about here] 
 Despite its economic importance, there is almost no systematic econometric evidence 
on whether merger control achieves what it is supposed to achieve, namely to “protect and 
restore effective competition.” This paper is the first study to accomplish this. We analyze the 
                                                 
1 See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/stats.html for statistics on EU merger control.  
2 We thank Joe Clougherty and Jo Seldeslachts for providing us with this data (see Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and 
Barros, 2006). While our approach looks at the effectiveness of particular policy decisions in restoring 
competition, they focus on possible deterrence effects that some of the antitrust decisions might have. They find 
that only outright blockings have a deterrence effect on future notifications. 
3 Note, however, that this might also be due to the kinds of mergers under scrutiny by the EC. They are all big 
mergers, the smaller ones being under the jurisdiction of the national authorities. The DOJ and FTC, instead, are 
in charge of all mergers happening in the US. If one believes that big mergers are on average more likely to be 
anticompetitive than smaller ones, then one should observe more intervention by the EC than by the DOJ and 
FTC. 
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effects of merger control decisions using a sample of 167 mergers scrutinized by the 
European Commission between 1990 and 2002. In a first step we use standard event study 
methodology to compute the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around relevant 
events for both merging firms as well as for rival firms, which have been identified by the 
Commission itself and retrieved from its published files. According to our approach, the 
CAAR around the merger’s announcement capture the merger competitive impact, while the 
CAAR around the announcement of the Commission decision measures the merger control’s 
effects.  
The novelty of our approach lies in relating these stock market reactions using 
regression analysis to measure the effectiveness of merger control. The general idea is that 
anticompetitive rents generated by the merger either for merging firms or - and in particular - 
for their rivals at the announcement of the merger should be dissipated by the final antitrust 
authority decision, if this decision is effective in preserving competition. Consequently, in this 
case, we expect a negative relationship between decision CAARs and announcement CAARs. 
Moreover, the design of our tests gives us an absolute benchmark of the remedies’ 
effectiveness and, simultaneously, a robustness check for our method: we know whether 
outright blockings are effective in restoring competition by whether they re-establish the pre-
merger situation. Thus, we expect a coefficient of minus one in this case: all rents that would 
be generated by this anticompetitive merger are dissipated by the antitrust authority’s final 
decision to block the merger. 
 Reassuringly, we get a significant negative coefficient in case of blocking decisions 
and it is not significantly different from minus one. However, we do not always get negative 
coefficients when other remedies have been applied, casting doubts on their general 
effectiveness. Sometimes we even get significantly positive coefficients in the rivals’ 
regressions and, for the same cases, significantly negative coefficients for the merging firms. 
This finding points to substantial rent transfers from merging firms to their rivals when 
remedies are ordered without solving the anticompetitive problem.  
A second novelty of our paper is to propose a way to account for the market 
expectation about the antitrust inquiry’s outcome. In fact, some of our results could be 
explained by the market updating its beliefs about a particular antitrust action, once the 
uncertainty about the merger investigation is resolved. We use observable mergers’ 
characteristics to estimate the probability of a particular decision and correct our profitability 
measures accordingly. Our main results about the effectiveness of blocking and the relative 
ineffectiveness of remedies are not only confirmed but even reinforced. 
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Finally, to underline the robustness of our approach and results, we apply a second 
methodology based on (balance sheet) profitability effects two years after the merger to 
estimate the merger’s effects following Gugler et al. (2003), and show that the results are 
consistent. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the institutional background of 
the EU merger control. In section 3 we shortly describe the related literature on the 
assessment of antitrust decisions. Section 4 discusses our main methodology and hypotheses 
and highlights our approach to correct the profitability measures for the market expectation 
about the antitrust investigation. In section 5, we introduce the data, present the results of the 
event studies, and discuss some measurement issues. Section 6 highlights our main results and 
presents a first set of robustness checks. In section 7 we discuss the methodology based on 
balance sheet data and present a second set of robustness checks. Finally, section 8 sums up 
and concludes with some remarks. 
 
2. Institutional Details 
Merger control in the EU began with the European Communities Merger Regulation 
(ECMR), which came into force on September 21, 1990.4 Since then more than 4,000 mergers 
were scrutinized by the European Commission. According to the ECMR, a merger has 
community dimension, hence it is under jurisdiction of the Commission, if “it takes place 
between firms with a combined worldwide turnover of at least 5 billion Euros and a turnover 
within the European Economic Area of more than 250 million Euros for each of at least two 
of the undertakings unless each undertaking achieves more than 2/3 of its aggregate 
Community turnover within one and the same member state.” This definition also includes 
mergers between firms that produce outside of Europe and sell into Europe.  If necessary, a 
merger can be referred back to the member states for review. 
Art. 2(3) of the ECMR states that  “A concentration, which creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded 
in the common market or in a substantial part of it, shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market.”  This is commonly referred to as the dominance test (DT).  DT constitutes 
an important difference to the SLC (Substantial lessening of competition) test, which is used 
                                                 
4 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 was amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings that entered into force on January 20, 2004. Commission Regulation 
(EC) No.802/2004 implements the Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004. See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/review/ for a description of the review process. 
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by US competition authorities. Some observers (e.g., Lyons, 2004) argue that the DT puts 
unnecessary weight on the concept of dominance in cases where the more important issue 
concerns the significant impediment of effective competition. The new merger regulation, 
which is applicable from May 1, 2004, focuses on a merger’s impact on competition. 
These regulations define the legal steps, which serve to control concentrations 
between undertakings (see figure 2). Merging parties are obliged to notify their intentions to 
merge to the Commission when the deal has a community dimension. After receiving 
notification of the concentration, the Commission has 25 working days to assess whether the 
concentration is compatible with the common market (the so called phase 1). 
 
[figure 2 about here] 
After this short period of time, the Commission can either clear the proposed 
concentration unconditionally (Art 6.1.b), it can decide to let it go through after verifying that 
the commitments and obligations proposed by the undertakings can effectively restore 
competition (Art. 6.2.), or it can decide that the proposed concentrations raise serious doubts 
as to their compatibility with the common market (Art. 6.1c) and, therefore, a more in depth 
analysis is needed. Notice that the Commission cannot outright block a merger after the phase 
1 investigation. In this case, the Commission opens the so-called phase 2, which consists of 
90 working days, and during which an in depth investigation is carried out. Generally, the 
Commission makes use of the entire available time, given the problematic nature of these 
cases, after which it has to come to a final decision: either to block the merger (Art. 8.3) or to 
let it through unconditionally or with commitments and obligations (Art. 8.2.). 
Looking at figure 2, there are three events, which are important for our empirical 
analysis. The first is the merger announcement, which we define as the first rumor appearing 
in the press about the proposed merger, and which should help us identify the market 
assessment of the merger’s competitive effects. The other two relevant events are the phase 1 
and the phase 2 decision dates, which should help us identify the effect of remedial action, as 
we will discuss in section 4. 
 
3. Literature 
 Despite the large interest attracted by antitrust issues in the literature, the study of the 
effectiveness of merger control decisions, which is the aim of our paper, has been very 
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limited.5 The most recent analyses of this question are two reports commissioned by the 
world’s leading antitrust authorities: US and EU. The study commissioned by the FTC (1999) 
reviews 35 divestiture orders from 1990 through 1994.6  Based on interviews, the authors 
argue that most divestitures appear to have created viable competitors in the concerned market 
(28 out of 37), whereas a higher percentage (19 out of 22) of divestitures were successful 
when they involved the sale of an entire ongoing business. Similarly, at the end of 2005 the 
Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission published an in-house 
study on merger remedies (DG Comp, 2005). It reviews the design and implementation of 85 
different remedies adopted in 40 decisions of the European Commission between 1996 and 
2000. Also in this case, the analysis is done by means of interviews with the committing 
parties or sellers, licensors and grantors, the purchasers or buyers, licensees and grantees and 
the trustees. More than half (57% ) of the analyzed remedies were considered to have been 
effective, 24% were only partially effective since they raised design or implementation issues 
that were not resolved during implementation, only 7% were clearly “ineffective”, and 12% 
have been categorized as “unclear” remedies. While certainly informative, the fact that these 
divestiture studies only use qualitative information (interviews) for a small number of cases 
limits their validity for a more comprehensive sample. 
 In this paper, we propose to use an event study methodology to directly assess merger 
control’s effectiveness. Eckbo (1983), Stillman (1983), and Eckbo and Wier (1985) are the 
first papers that use event studies to analyze antitrust decisions.7 Rather than looking at stock 
reactions to a particular antitrust decision as a way of identifying its effectiveness, they use 
this event to identify the competitive nature of the merger, i.e. whether market power or 
efficiencies are the drivers of post-merger firms’ profitability. Eckbo and Wier (1985) look at 
259 horizontal and vertical mergers in mining and manufacturing industries of which 76 were 
challenged.  Although they find significantly positive abnormal returns for rival firms, they 
argue that this positive valuation effect may be due to positive information released by the 
merger: the merger announcement is good news from the rival firms’ perspective, because it 
                                                 
5 See Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2006) for an in depth analysis of the literature. 
6 Earlier studies tried to evaluate the ex post effectiveness of ordered remedies in the USA using a case-by-case 
approach.  Elzinga (1969), Pfunder, Plaine and Whittemore (1972) and Rogowsky (1986) use a methodology 
that is based on classifying ordered remedies as successful, sufficient, deficient, or unsuccessful depending on 
whether they fulfill certain criteria. While Elzinga (1969) argues that only one out of ten cases can be classified 
as successful or sufficient, the success rate in Rogowsky’s (1986) sample increases to four out of ten.   
7 Ellert (1976) is the first study that looks at valuation effects of anti-merger complaints.  He does not, however, 
consider the impact on rival firms’ stock returns. There are also a number of studies that use event study 
methodology to evaluate the effects of mergers but do not analyze antitrust authority decisions, such as Banerjee 
and Eckard (1998), McGuckin et al. (1992), Mullin et al. (1995), Shahrur (2005), Simpson (2001), Singal 
(1996), Slovin et al. (1991), and Song and Walkling (2000). 
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makes them (or the market) aware of real profit opportunities that were so far unknown.  To 
separate the market power effect from the information effect, they also estimate abnormal 
returns to rival firms around the time of an antitrust challenge, however, do not find 
statistically significant abnormal decreases in the stock prices of rival firms. Thus, they claim 
that the mergers in their sample do not raise market power on average. Several follow-up 
studies tackle the same issue. Schumann (1993) conducts an event study analysis of 37 
acquisitions that were challenged by the FTC over the period 1981-1987 and comes up with 
the same pattern of abnormal returns as in Eckbo (1983) and Eckbo and Wier (1985).  He 
reports positive abnormal returns to rivals around the antitrust complaint, which are positive 
and larger for smaller rivals.8 
 Fee and Shaw (2004) also find only little evidence consistent with collusion.  They 
look at the upstream and downstream product market effects of horizontal mergers and 
identify the customers, suppliers, and rivals of the merging firms.  In their sample of 554 US 
mergers, the net effect of a merger on a particular supplier depends largely on the supplier’s 
ability to retain its product market relationship with the merged entity. They report positive 
abnormal returns to rivals of merging firms around announcements, which range from 0.67% 
to 2.61%.  The antitrust challenge of such mergers, however, does not lead to negative 
abnormal returns for rivals. The evidence provided by Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) on 
the antitrust action against Microsoft also rejects the joint hypothesis that (a) Microsoft’s 
conduct was anticompetitive and (b) antitrust policy enforcement produced net efficiency 
gains.9 
 In contrast to this fairly long list of event studies on mergers in the US, there are only 
a few very recent studies of mergers that were analyzed by the European Commission.10 
Using the same sample of EU mergers utilized in this paper, Duso, Neven, and Röller (2006) 
find evidence in favor of the market power hypothesis. Yet, they only look at whether the 
Commission made errors and their determinants, without further exploring the issue of 
whether the Commission’s decisions were on the whole effective. Aktas et al. (2004) look at 
602 EU Commission’s decisions involving 1070 firms, and document significant abnormal 
returns for the target firms and smaller and less significant bidder abnormal returns.  Similarly 
                                                 
8 For a criticism of this methodology, see McAfee and Williams (1988). 
9 Carstensen (1999) offers a less favorable conclusion on the Microsoft case.  See also Comanor (2001), who 
discusses the problem of remedy in the specific Microsoft case. 
10 Brady and Feinberg (2000) use event studies to evaluate the impact of the EU merger regulation’s introduction 
and the effects of particular news with respect to the development of EU procedures in specific cases (like the 
decision to open a phase 2 investigation). They focus on merging firms and do not consider the effect on 
competitors. 
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to our results, they also estimate the abnormal stock price reaction to phase 1 and phase 2 
decisions and find that outright prohibitions are associated with negative abnormal returns and 
approvals subject to conditions are relatively good news.  In another paper, Aktas et al. (2006) 
suggest that European merger control is protectionist.  They reach this conclusion by showing 
that the likelihood of an intervention by the EU Commission is higher, whenever the merger 
is proposed by a bidder from outside the EU and has a negative effect on European rivals. 
 Summing up, the evidence on mergers and merger control decisions is rather mixed. 
While most studies find positive effects of the merger for rivals, the interpretation differs. 
Some authors interpret this as being consistent with the information revelation hypothesis 
(e.g. Eckbo, 1983; and Eckbo and Wier, 1985), while other authors interpret it as consistent 
with market power (e.g. Singal, 1996). There is no event study explicitly analyzing the 
effectiveness of ordered remedies. Studies of remedies on a case-by-case approach point to 
the superiority of structural over behavioral remedies, but leave doubt about their general 
effectiveness. Theoretical arguments underline this.11 In what follows, we try to resolve these 
ambiguities by (1) relating announcement and decision abnormal returns and (2) conducting 
an ex post study of merger effects. 
 
4. Hypotheses and Methods 
When firms decide to merge, they potentially generate two externalities on rival firms:  A 
positive externality due to the merger’s market power effect and a negative externality due to 
the potential efficiency gains generated by the merger. The first effect arises since, post-
merger, there is one less firm in the market and, ceteris paribus, pricing will be less aggressive 
leading to higher prices and profits (“price umbrella”).12 Merging firms internalize their 
former negative pricing externality on each other and set higher prices, ceteris paribus. In both 
Cournot and Bertrand with differentiated products type of models, market output declines and 
prices rise absent efficiency gains (see Salant et al., 1983; Farell and Shapiro, 1990; or Gugler 
and Siebert, 2004). Particularly, rival firms gain since they need not bear the quantity 
reduction of insiders and nevertheless benefit from the higher prices: the merger paradox. The 
                                                 
11 Motta et al. (2003) enumerate the most important pros and cons of the different kinds of remedies (i.e. 
structural and behavioral) used by the European Commission.  While they in principle favor the use of structural 
remedies to clear problematic mergers, they also point to information asymmetries and incentive problems, as 
well as to the increased possibility of pro-collusive effects of divestitures. Farrell (2003) argues that the 
effectiveness of structural remedies may suffer from inadequate buyers, "over" (or miss-) fixing and the 
discounting of merger efficiencies.  Cabral (2003) also qualifies for the superiority of structural remedies.  
12 This is the sum of the anticompetitive effects of a merger that are called in the antitrust jargon “unilateral 
effects” – price increases due to imperfectly competitive markets – and “coordinated effects” – price increases 
due to the post-merger increased likelihood of collusive agreements. 
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second effect, higher efficiency, leads to lower prices and benefits only insiders. Rival firms 
lose from fiercer competition. 
An effective merger control policy should target only anticompetitive mergers: where 
the market power problems are severe and strong enough to overcome any positive welfare 
effects due to efficiency gains. Moreover, in such mergers, the antitrust authority should be 
able to reduce the rents stemming from increased market power without destroying rents 
stemming from increased efficiency. Therefore, to measure merger control effectiveness we 
need three steps: (i) classify anticompetitive mergers, (ii) measure the rents generated by 
mergers and antitrust decisions, and (iii) relate these measures by means of regression 
analysis. We next discuss these three steps. 
 
4.1 Merger Taxonomy: Anticompetitive Mergers 
For a large class of static oligopoly models, a merger generates unilateral incentives to 
increase prices for both merging firms and rivals at costs of consumers. Hence, there exists a 
clear correspondence between increase in rivals’ profits and the decrease in consumers’ 
surplus after the merger if efficiency gains are absent (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990).13 This will 
be one of our main identifying assumptions: a merger is anticompetitive (i.e. reduces 
consumers’ surplus) if it increases competitors’ profits.14 
In principle, a merger might have four possible effects on the merging and rival firms’ 
profits. Table 1 lists these four possibilities as well as the optimal incidence of an antitrust 
action. If the merger generates positive profits for both the merging and the rival firms 
( 0M∆Π >  and 0R∆Π > ),15 the market power effect following from the merger outweighs 
any efficiency gains. In this case, the authority should act by imposing the appropriate 
remedies or by blocking the merger.  
 
[table 1 about here] 
 
If the merger generates positive profits for the merging firms but has a negative effect 
on rival firms' profits ( 0M∆Π >  and 0R∆Π < ), the efficiency effect of the merger outweighs 
                                                 
13 Duso, Neven, and Röller (2006) present a formal derivation of this result. They show that it holds for Cournot 
and Bertrand with differentiated goods. 
14 Implicitly, we assume that the antitrust agency follows a consumer surplus standard, which indeed is the 
welfare standard adopted by the US and EU authorities. 
15 i∆Π (i= M, R) represent changes in profits following the merger for merging firms (M) and rivals (R) 
respectively. 
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the market power effect, since only merging firms enjoy increased efficiency. There should be 
no remedies in this case, at least none that (also) reduce the efficiency gains from the 
merger.16  
The fact that mergers, which reduce the efficiency and profits of merging firms, 
happen cannot be well explained by standard industrial organization models.17 Nevertheless, 
there is overwhelming evidence that many of such mergers do take place. For example, 
Gugler et al. (2003) find several of these mergers taking place around the world and attribute 
them to managerial motives, such as growth and size maximization. Within this category, two 
cases can be distinguished: mergers that reduce the profits of the merging firms but increase 
the profits of the rival firms and mergers that reduce profitability of both parties. In the first 
case, if industry profits go up ( 0I∆Π > ), the merger may be considered as being 
predominantly anticompetitive since rival firms react to the reduced efficiency of the merging 
firms by increasing their prices. Here remedies may be considered, although the source of the 
problem is not one of competition policy but one of inadequate corporate governance. If 
industry profits go down, nothing can be said about the anticompetitive effects and necessary 
remedies. The same holds true in the last case, where both merging and rival firms’ profits 
decrease ( 0M∆Π <  and 0R∆Π < ). 
 
4.2. Measuring Firms’ Profitability: The Event Study Methodology 
In the first step of our analysis, we use event study methodology to measure firms’ profit 
increases.18  Under the assumptions of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market 
model predicts that firm i’s stock return at day t ( tiR , ) is proportional to a daily market return 
( tmR , ): 
titmti RR ,,, εβα ++= . 
                                                 
16 Remember that, according to the merger regulation, efficiencies should be “merger specific” and should 
“benefit consumers”. See Röller et al. (2001) on considerations about the role of efficiency gains in merger 
control. 
17 One exception is the literature on pre-emptive mergers (see Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005). In these models, 
profit maximizing firms rationally do unprofitable mergers in order to pre-empt rivals, in those cases where 
being an insider is more profitable than being an outsider. Alternatively, Banal-Estañol and Seldeslachts (2005) 
propose a theory of merger failures based on private information about synergy gains, costly integration efforts, 
and strategic uncertainty. Of course, another simple explanation is that unprofitable mergers happen just because 
managers make evaluation mistakes in a world with imperfect information. 
18 In section 7 we will introduce an alternative approach for measuring firms’ profitability based on accounting 
data (see Gugler et al. 2003), which will be used to test the robustness of the approach developed here.  
 12
To study the stock price reaction to the mergers’ announcement, we estimate the market 
model over 240 trading days, starting 50 days prior to the announcement day and using the 
Scholes–Williams (1977) method. We obtain estimated values for the model’s parameters α 
and β, which we can use to predict what firm i’s stock price would have been, had the event 
under consideration (merger or antitrust decision) not occurred. For firm i, we calculate then 
the abnormal return around the mergers’ announcement day t (ARi,t) as: 
tmtitititi R RRRAR ,,,,, ˆˆˆ βα −−=−= . 
Under the null hypothesis of efficient markets, abnormal returns have zero mean and a 
variance equal to: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++=
m
mmt
ti
RR
L
ARVar tj 2
2
, 1
1)( , σσ ε , 
where L is the estimation period length and mR  and m
2σ  are respectively the mean and 
variance of the market portfolio. 
For merging firms and all rivals, we then calculate a cumulative abnormal return over 
an event window of x+y+1 days (x,y = 0, 1, 2, etc.): 
∑+=
−=
=
yt
xt
jyxti ARCAR
τ
τ
τ,,,, . 
In order to obtain the aggregate effects of merger j on merging firms (i=M) and on rivals 
(i=R) around the events of interest ( aij∆Π , where a = A, D denotes the event: merger’s 
announcement, A, and antitrust decision’s announcement, D), we take the weighted average of 
the cumulative abnormal returns of all firms in each of the two groups (i=M,R), the weight 
being firm j’s market value ( ajMV ):
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19 With a slight abuse of notation, due to nature of our data where the unit of observation is not the firm but 
rather the merger, we drop the time index t and the window indexes x and y. We introduce instead the index a = 
A (announcement), D (decision). Moreover, from now on, the index i will not indicate a particular firm but rather 
a group of firms i=M (merging firms), R (rivals). Nij represents the maximum number of firms in each of the two 
groups for merger j. 
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These weighted average abnormal returns give us a measure of the merger and decision 
profitability effects. We can now define merger j to be anticompetitive if 0>∆Π ARj . 
 
4.3. Hypotheses Testing 
We can now turn to the measurement of merger control’s effectiveness. After the merger, 
insider firms’ profitability should rise due to both effects highlighted before: higher market 
power and efficiency. Hence, their cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around the 
announcement of the merger should be positive (i.e. 0>∆Π AMj ). Rival firms’ profitability – 
hence their CAARs around the merger announcement - should rise only if the merger 
increases product market prices (i.e. the market power effect is larger than the efficiency 
effect), and should diminish if the reverse is true. 
 The decisions of antitrust authorities can also have two major effects. Either the 
antitrust action - i.e. clearance (no action), remedies, or blocking - is effective or not. A 
clearance decision should not impact firms’ profitability, since it corresponds to the absence 
of an antitrust action. Remedies, instead, should have different effects depending on the 
merger’s competitive nature and their effectiveness. If, for instance, remedies are applied to 
the right mergers - i.e. those that would otherwise increase product prices and are hence 
anticompetitive - and they are effective, the decision-day abnormal returns of both, merging 
( DMj∆Π ) and rival firms ( DRj∆Π ), should be negative. Yet, only the fraction of merging firms’ 
positive profitability increase due to the market power effect should be dissipated by effective 
remedies, since the antitrust action should not destroy the merger induced efficiency gains. If 
remedies are applied to the wrong (pro-competitive) mergers, the decision day abnormal 
returns of merging firms should be negative ( 0<∆Π DMj ) and the CAARs of rival firms should 
be positive ( 0>∆Π DRj ). If remedies are not effective, stock markets should not react. The 
extreme action taken by the Commission, i.e. blockings, should of course be “effective” in the 
sense that it should revert to the pre-merger situation. 
This reasoning is true only if the market does not have expectations about the effect of 
the antitrust action, otherwise many of the observed effects could simply be due to 
information revelation and represent an update of the market’s priors about the Commission’s 
decision. We will pick up on this point in the next section, where we develop an approach to 
account for this problem. 
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 According to the discussion above, we propose to measure the "degree of 
effectiveness" of an antitrust action by running the following basic regression: 
 
ijj
A
ijjB
A
ijjD
A
ijjO
A
ijjC
D
ij gXBbDbObCba η++∆Π⋅⋅+∆Π⋅⋅+∆Π⋅⋅+∆Π⋅⋅+=∆Π  (1) 
 
where subscript i denotes either merging or rival firms and subscript j denotes the merger, 
which is our unit of observation. The dummy Cj takes on the value of one, if merger j is 
cleared without commitments and zero otherwise. The dummy Oj takes on the value of one 
and zero otherwise, if merger j is cleared with mainly behavioural commitments, such as 
terminating existing exclusive agreements, granting access to a necessary infrastructure, or 
licensing agreements, i.e. all those remedies that are not divestitures and which are mentioned 
in the Commission Notice on remedies (2001) under “Other remedies”. The dummy Dj takes 
on the value of one and zero otherwise, if merger j is only cleared under the commitment that 
parts of the combined company are divested (structural remedies). The dummy Bj takes on the 
value of one and zero otherwise, if merger j is blocked after an in depth analysis of the case. 
The variables contained in X are exogenous controls. 
It is important to notice that the direction of causality must run from announcement 
day abnormal returns to decision period abnormal returns: the EU Commission should impose 
stricter remedies in cases where potential market power concerns are more severe. That is, 
announcement day abnormal returns determine the Commission’s action, which in turn 
determines decision period abnormal returns. 
 The b-coefficients measure the degree of market power (profit) reversion due to the 
final decision of the EU Commission. That is, if remedies are effective, then profits due to 
market power at the announcement day should be (at least partially) dissipated by the final 
decision and b should be negative. The higher these profits (or abnormal returns) are around 
the announcement day, the larger should be the decline in profits (abnormal returns) due to 
the decision. If remedies are perfectly effective in restoring competition, the hypothesis 
1−=b  should not be rejected for rivals: all anticompetitive rents generated by the merger are 
reversed by the final decision. This is not necessarily true for the merging firms, as we noted 
before, if part of the merger’s profitability effect is generated by efficiency gains. 
It should be noted that bB , i.e. the coefficient for blockings, must have a coefficient of 
minus one if our methodology is correct. We know that blocking is an effective remedy for an 
anticompetitive concern. This provides an additional test not only for our methodology, but 
more generally for using the event study methodology to assess anticompetitive effects of 
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mergers. Essentially, this complete profit reversion for both merging and rival firms is due to 
the fact that blocking restores the pre-merger situation.20 
 If remedies are not effective, this should show up in zero or positive b−coefficients for 
rival firms. Anticompetitive rents that the market foresaw at the merger announcement are 
reinforced (or at least not reduced) by the Commission’s decision. This could happen since 
the market expected tougher remedies and did not increase rivals’ share price adequately at 
the announcement day and now simply updated. Otherwise, it could happen since a 
behavioral remedy or a divestiture are considered as rent transfers from merging firms to 
rivals without remedying the anticompetitive concern.21 
 If the Commission wrongly imposed remedies - i.e. it imposed remedies to mergers 
that would increase efficiency - merging (rival) firms would lose (win) from such a decision, 
since the efficiency gains are not longer attainable. Therefore, we expect negative (positive) 
b's for merging (rival) firms. 
 
4.4. Accounting for Market Expectations 
Until now we have not considered that an efficient market should also account for the future 
antitrust decision when reacting to a merger announcement. Yet this seems to be a too strong 
assumption. We will now assume that the market can build expectation about the effect of the 
Commission’s action a (a=clear, action) on firms i for merger j ( aDij∆Π ), given the public 
information available in the market around the merger’s announcement day (IA). When 
expectations are rational, the expected value of the Commission’s decision can be written as:  
[ ] [ ] action clear,a    Ia PrIE
a
Aj
D
ijA
D
ij
a =∆Π=∆Π ∑ , , 
where [ ]Aj Ia Pr  is the probability of action a - i.e. clearance, remedies or blockings. 
The observed abnormal return for firms i (i=M, R) around the announcement day 
( Aij∆Π ) is then equal to the real effect of merger j for firms i ( *Aij∆Π ) minus the expected 
value of the effect of the Commission’s action, given the information available in the market 
at that time about remedies (IA). Assuming that any effective action (remedies or blockings) 
                                                 
20 However, one can expect even a coefficient smaller than minus one for merging firms, if the opportunity costs 
of going through the antitrust investigation are judged to be very high. 
21 See for example the merger between SIEMENS AG and VA TECH AG. In this case, the commission cleared 
the merger under the condition that Siemens divests one part of VA TECH, VA TECH Hydro, operating in the 
relevant market in Austria. Once the acquirer of this divested asset, Andriz AG - a direct competitor of Siemens 
in the Austrian market - was announced, its stock price jumped up by almost 10%. 
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destroys all anticompetitive profits accruing from the merger – i.e. *Aij
D
ij
a ∆Π=∆Π  – and a 
clearance does not have any profitability effect– i.e. 0=∆Π cDij  –, we can then write the 
following: 
 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
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A
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A
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ij
IclearIaction
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**
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**
∆Π=−∆Π=
∆Π−∆Π−∆Π=
∆Π−∆Π=∆Π
 
 
Therefore, the real effect of merger j on firms i is: 
[ ]AjAijAij IclearPr* ∆Π=∆Π ,   (2) 
i.e. the measured announcement CAAR divided by the ex-ante probability that the merger 
will be cleared.22 The market can build a prior of this probability by using past information, 
which is exactly what the econometrician can do by running a logit regression to asses the 
probability of clearance given the merger’s observables. Once one has such a measure, one 
can build a proxy for the merger j’s real effect on firms i’s profitability ( *Aij∆Π ) according to 
equation (2) and use this in regression (1) instead of Aij∆Π . 
Similarly, at the time of the Commission’s decision some new information hits the 
market, which updates its beliefs about the effects of a particular decision. The first important 
date is the phase 1 decision. The phase 1 decision’s effect ( 1Pij∆Π ) is the difference between 
the antitrust action’ real effect on firms i ( *Dij∆Π ) and the market expectation about this action 
for merger j. Of course, if all information is public, then there should be no surprise for the 
market and, hence, we should not observe any abnormal return around the decision day. Yet, 
it seems reasonable to assume that some private information generated during the bargaining 
process between the Commission and the merging parties is unknown to the market. If market 
power concerns are substantial and the Commission decides to open a phase 2 investigation, 
                                                 
22 This is true for competitors but not necessarily for the merging firms, since a part of the merger’s profitability 
effect does not come from an increase in market power but rather from increased efficiency, which should not be 
dissipated by the antitrust decision. Hence, it must not necessarily hold that *AMj
D
Mj
a ∆Π=∆Π . 
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the market updates its beliefs about remedies.23 Therefore, the abnormal returns around phase 
1 decision ( 1Pij∆Π ) for mergers that go into a phase 2 investigation should simply be the 
update of the market expectation about remedies, given the newer information set available at 
this point in time (IP1). 24  
Summarizing, the phase 1 effect is the following: 
[ ] [ ]( )
[ ] [ ]⎪⎪⎩
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Therefore, the real impact of the Commission’s decision for a case that does not go 
into phase 2 is: 
[ ]( )Aj
P
ijD
ij IactionPr1
1
*
−
∆Π=∆Π .  (3) 
Again, the market can have a prior about the probability of an action in phase 2 at the 
merger announcement. To control for that, we will use logit analysis to predict this probability 
as a function of the merger’s observables. 
Similarly, around the day of the phase 2 decision, the abnormal return ( 2Pij∆Π ) should 
measure the difference between the real value of an action in phase 2 (remedies or 
prohibitions) and the expectation that the market built given the information available on the 
phase 1 decision [ ] [ ]ADijPijDijPDijDijPij IE   IE *1*1**2 ∆Π−∆Π−∆Π=∆Π−∆Π=∆Π , i=M, R. Hence, 
at the end of a phase 2 investigation the impact of the Commission’s decision is: 
( ) [ ]( )AjPijPijDij IactionPr1/12* −∆Π+∆Π=∆Π .  (4) 
Again, we can compute the probability of an action by running a logit regression and 
correcting our profitability measure to account for it. We then run regression (1) by using 
*A
ij∆Π  and *Dij∆Π instead of Aij∆Π and Dij∆Π . 
                                                 
23 Indeed, when a case goes into phase 2, the probability of an antitrust intervention increases sharply. According 
to the statistics produced by the European Commission, the incidence of remedies in phase 1 is 4%, while it 
increases to over 60% in phase 2. Moreover, a merger can be prohibited only after a phase 2 investigation. 
24 Actually at the beginning of a phase 2 investigation, the market could also value the cost of such a procedure. 
Therefore, the abnormal return around the phase 1 decision for those mergers that went into a phase 2 
investigation might also reflect the high costs these firms are expected to pay. 
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5. The Data and the Estimated Abnormal Returns 
Our sample consists of 167 concentrations that have been analyzed by the European 
Commission in the period 1990-2002. Our starting database was developed in Duso, Neven, 
and Röller (2006). Our sample includes almost all phase 2 mergers scrutinized by the EC till 
the end of 2001, and a randomly drawn sample of phase 1 cases, which run up to June 2002. 
Because of difficulties in identifying competitors or their stock, we end up with 78 phase 2 
cases and 89 phase 1 cases for which we have complete information. We identify 544 
different firms involved in several mergers either as merging parties or as rivals. 
Merging firms and competitors are identified from the publicly available Commission’s 
decisions.25 This is a big advantage of our data set, since we can rely on the Commission’s 
analysis concerning the market definition (the relevant competitors). Furthermore, the 
Commission’s reports also provide in-depth information about the mergers’ and decisions’ 
characteristics, such as the kind of concentration (e.g. full versus partial merger), the nature of 
the merger (horizontal vs. conglomerate/vertical), the involved product and geographical 
markets, the kind of remedies imposed, the provenience of the involved firms, etc. 
The mergers’ announcement date is collected from the financial press by using the Dow 
Jones Interactive database. This is a customizable business news and research product that 
integrates contents from newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports, and web sites. We 
look at the first rumors about the merger, i.e. the first time a discussion of the merger appears 
in the international press, and not necessarily the official merger’s announcement by the 
involved parties. This has the advantage of reducing the noise in identifying the “right” event. 
On the other hand, our measure of abnormal returns might be downward biased since there 
might still be uncertainty on whether the merger will take place or not. 
Finally, once firms have been identified, we collect information about their 
characteristics form two sources. For the first part of the analysis, where we measure 
profitability by means of event studies, we collect data on firms’ stock prices and market 
value as well as market indexes by using Thomson Financial’s Datastream. This database 
provides financial information and computation services to the securities industry worldwide. 
For the second part of the analysis, we use the Standard & Poor’s Global Vantage and 
Compustat databases to retrieve information about firms’ accounting profits and total assets 
from their balance sheets. 
                                                 
25 The reports for each of the Commission’s decisions can be downloaded form the Commission’s webpage: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/. 
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Table 2 presents a short description of the relevant variables. The market value of the 
combined firm (rivals) is on average 45 (7.5) billion US dollars. On average, the Commission 
reports 7.6 rival firms, and we could find stock market information for 62.5% of them. The 
majority of the concentrations in our sample (57.1%) were full mergers, 24% joint ventures, 
13.1% partial acquisitions, 11.3% tender offers, and only 6% consisted of asset acquisitions. 
In 41.1% of the cases the geographical market definition is the European Economic Area, in 
35.1% it was defined to be national, in 21% it was worldwide, and in a few cases it was left 
open because the geographical definition was not relevant for the decision. 
Remedies have been imposed in 35.1% of the mergers (6.6% in phase 1 and 28.7% in 
phase 2), and 7.7% were blocked. Considering these prohibitions as an extreme type of 
remedy, we have 43.1% of the cases in our sample where the Commission intervened to 
modify the merger in order to restore effective competition.  
 
[table 2 about here] 
 
Remedies are categorized as structural or behavioral using the information contained 
in the Commission’s decision. In 23.5% of the cases the Commission ordered a divestiture, 
while in 10.8% it imposed other kinds of remedies. For the purpose of this study we will 
consider these two categories - which happen to be those used in the merger remedies 
guidelines - and blockings. The selling of shares was imposed in 10.3% of cases, licensing 
agreements in 11.5%, the access to essential technologies or facilities in 9.7%, the dismissing 
of exclusive agreements in 7.3%, and the dissolution of interlocking directorates only in 3.6% 
of the mergers in our sample. 
Table 3 reports statistics on cumulative average abnormal returns for merging firms and 
competitors around various events and using different event windows. We consider a short 
window from 5 days before to 5 days after the merger, and a long window that goes back 50 
days before the event. For each event, we look at how abnormal returns differ according to the 
future Commission’s decision. 
 
[table 3 about here] 
 
The mergers in our sample were on average “profitable” since the CAARs for the 
merging firms around the announcement date are positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level for all used windows. The size of the effects ranges from 1.05% in the short window 
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to 1.8% in the long window. This result seems to be in line with the literature.26 The 
cumulative abnormal returns for the rivals around the announcement date are, instead, not 
statistically significant different from zero and very small in size.27 On average, these mergers 
seem to be welfare-neutral, in the sense that they neither increase nor decrease the average 
rivals’ profitability. The breakdown across later decisions reveals significant effects for those 
mergers that are either cleared with no remedies in phase 1 (efficiency-enhancing mergers?) 
or that were cleared with remedies in phase 2 (market power mergers?). 
Looking at phase 1 decisions, we observe negative CAARs for the merging firms as 
well as for the rivals.28 These are, however, statistically significant only for the merging firms 
using the short window. The negative effect stems mainly from those cases where a phase 2 
investigation was started: The negative CAARs for the merging firms in that case are on 
average -1.7% in the short window and -1.4% in the long window. Similarly, rivals lose from 
the opening of a phase 2 investigation (in the long window up to -1.1%). Interestingly, 
decisions that either clear mergers in phase 1 (with or without remedies) in the short window 
and those decisions that lead to later blockings (long window) decrease rival firms' market 
value by a rather large and significant 3.5%. If (presumably) efficiency enhancing mergers are 
cleared without - or with ineffective - remedies, or if (presumably) market power enhancing 
mergers are blocked, rival firms lose, which is exactly the pattern we predict and observe. 
 For phase 2 decisions, almost all measures of abnormal returns are statistically 
insignificant. Nevertheless, looking at the long run CAARs, we observe strong negative, 
though not significant, effects for the rivals in those mergers that were cleared with remedies 
(-1.8%) or blocked (-5.5%). Moreover, merging firms have large and significant positive 
long-run abnormal returns (+6.6%) in those mergers that were cleared without conditions. The 
market expected some negative effects at the phase 1 decision day for merging firms, but was 
surprised that the Commission did not impose remedies. 
The next question is what is the “right” profitability measure to be used in the 
regressions? If there is no information leakage, the right measure would be the abnormal 
                                                 
26 See for instance Andrade et al. (2002). In fact, the merging firms’ CAAR is the weighted sum of the acquiring 
and of the target firms’ abnormal returns. Depending on the event window, we estimate average abnormal 
returns for acquirers in the range between -0.54% and 0.12% (not statistically significantly different from zero) 
and for the targets in the range between 3.4% and 6.2% (statistically significantly greater than zero at the 1% 
level). These results are quite similar to those reported by Aktas et al. (2004) using a comparable sample of 
mergers. Note, however, that in their sample the phase 2 cases are more underrepresented than in ours. 
27 The abnormal returns for rivals are measured with errors, since we lost part of them due to the fact that they 
are small - not quoted - firms. Because we have mostly the biggest competitors in our sample, we possibly have 
another bias towards “no significance”: big firms derive probably only a small fraction of their revenues from the 
market under consideration and are, therefore, only partially affected by the merger. 
28 Note that we use a shorter window for the long term CAARs around the phase 1 decision, since the period of 
time between the notification and the phase 1 decision is only one month. 
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return at the event day. However, if we think that some relevant information was present in 
the market already before this event, then a larger window should more carefully capture the 
real effects. Looking at figure 3, which shows time plots of daily cumulative abnormal returns 
averaged over merging firms and rivals, respectively, for the period from 50 days prior until 5 
days after major events, we can get a feeling of how much of a surprise the event under 
consideration was. For both types of firms, we see an upward drift of abnormal returns 
beginning some 50 days before the announcement of the merger for merging firms and some 
30 days for rivals. Hence, we decide to use the long-run window (-50, +5) to measure the 
merger’s effect.  
For the CAARs around the Commission’s decisions, we breakdown the figure 
according to the kind of decision: clear, remedies, or opening of a phase 2 investigation for 
the phase 1 decisions; and clear, remedies, block for the phase 2 decisions. Phase 1 decisions 
– specifically, remedies in phase 1 - seem to come as a relative surprise. We therefore decide 
to take the short-run window (-5, +5) to measure the rents generated by this event.29 
Differently, for the phase 2 decisions, we observe quite a bit of movement in the long 
run CAARs for all kinds of decisions suggesting that information leaks out to stock markets 
in the course of the second investigation’s phase. This makes sense, since phase 2 is much 
longer and attracts much more public attention than phase 1. Moreover, the Commission 
might provide some information to the market by applying the so-called “market test”, where 
it asks competitors and customers to evaluate the proposed conditions. Thus, we think that the 
long-run window should better capture the market assessment of the Commission’s decision. 
For mergers cleared in phase 1, the Commission’s decision effect is simply defined as 
the abnormal return around the phase 1 decision date. For cases that go to phase 2, instead, we 
define the decision’s effect as the sum of the phase 1 and phase 2 decision date abnormal 
returns, since around the phase 1 decision the market updates its beliefs about the final 
outcome. In fact, the probability that the merger will be blocked or cleared with remedies 
sharply increases when a merger goes into a phase 2 investigation. 
 
6. Results 
In this section we present the main results and several robustness checks. We start by using 
the CAARs not corrected for the probability of antitrust action as a benchmark case. We then 
look at several sub-samples to qualify our findings. We finally show that the main results hold 
                                                 
29 We however run all tests also using the longer window. Our results remain mostly unchanged. 
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true also correcting for the market’s expectation about the Commission’s decision. Yet, 
differences emerge, which helps to explain some of the previous findings. 
 
6.1. Main Regressions 
Table 4 presents our main regression results. Regressions are run separately for merging firms 
and rivals. According to equation (1), the dependent variable is the decision CAAR of 
merging firms or rivals, while the main independent variable is the corresponding 
announcement CAAR of merging or rival firms respectively. In the different specifications, 
we interact this independent variable with several sets of dummies for the Commission’s 
decision, as well as for the merger competitive effect as discussed in section 4.3. Finally, in 
all specifications we control for time as well as industry effects (manufacturing and 
communications) and for those cases where conglomerate and/or foreclosure aspects play a 
role (i.e. not purely horizontal mergers) by adding a dummy.30 
Panel A presents the results for the entire sample. Neither for insiders nor for rivals is 
there a significant relation between announcement and decision CAARs. There is also no 
significant difference in effects for those mergers that were cleared with remedies or blocked 
(ACTION) or cleared outright (CLEAR). As we will see, however, this masks important 
differences across sub-samples. 
 
 [table 4 about here] 
 
 When we interact announcement CAARs not only with action/clearance dummies but 
simultaneously with indicators for anticompetitive - rival announcement CAARs = ARj∆Π > 0 - 
vs. pro-competitive - rival announcement CAARs = ARj∆Π  < 0 - mergers, an interesting 
difference arises for merging firms. Merging firms lose a part of the efficiency gains from a 
merger, if remedies are wrongly applied in pro-competitive mergers: the coefficient’s point 
estimate is equal to -0.29 and statistically significant different from zero. 
 When we breakup actions into outright blockings (BLOCK), divestitures 
(DIVESTITURE), and other remedies (OTHERREM), it becomes evident that the blocking 
decisions generate a rent reversion for rivals. We estimate a significant coefficient  bΒ of -
0.69, significantly different form zero but not significantly different from minus one at 
                                                 
30 A merger has been defined to have conglomerate or vertical (foreclosure) effects if the Commission stated so 
in its report. 
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conventional significance levels. This is our first important finding: blocking is effective in 
restoring the pre-merger situation. 
The rents earned by rivals around the announcement of the merger are actually 
exacerbated by the Commission’s decision to impose divestitures ( bD = 0.46, significant at 
the 1% level). The coefficient for other remedies is also positive ( bO = 0.34) but not 
significant. This could be the case if divestitures or other remedies were imposed in the wrong 
mergers, i.e. efficiency enhancing mergers, and/or these remedies were not effective in 
solving the anticompetitive problems identified by the Commission but rather resulted in a 
rent transfer to rivals. For example, rival firms could buy the divested assets at below market 
value prices. There are a number of reasons why this could be the case: deadlines for sale, 
buyer approval by the Commission, etc. 
 The last regression in panel A of table 4 combines the interaction terms of the above 
two panels. It is evident that the rent reversion of rival profits is due to the blocking of 
anticompetitive mergers by the EU Commission. The coefficient rises to a significantly 
negative 0.79, again not significantly different from minus one. Essentially all rents of the 
rivals from an anticompetitive merger are dissipated by the blocking decision of the EU 
Commission. In contrast, by the forced divestiture of assets in anticompetitive mergers, rivals’ 
rents are additionally increased, and effective competition is not restored. Interestingly, there 
appears to exist a rent transfer from the merging firms to the rivals when pro-competitive 
mergers are levied with other remedies: the coefficient for rivals is positive and significant 
(bO = 1.41) while the estimated coefficient for merging firms is negative though not 
significant (bO = -0.39). 
Merging firms’ abnormal returns around the decision day do not correlate significantly 
with their announcement day counterparts, with the startling exception of outright blockings. 
In this case, merging firms lose either a significant share of their market power rents (bB = -
0.52) or their returns from investing in efficiency mergers (-0.80). Interestingly, it seems to be 
worse for merging firms if a pro-competitive rather than an anticompetitive merger is 
blocked. 
 Our results on the entire sample provide strong evidence that: (1) blockings restore 
effective competition in mergers that the market has identified as anticompetitive. (2) 
Remedies, be they behavioral or structural like divestitures, are on average not successful in 
restoring effective competition. In some cases, especially if wrongly applied to pro-
competitive mergers, they merely result in rent transfers from merging firms to their rivals. 
Yet, this does not preclude effective remedies in some mergers that are well designed, as it is 
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evidenced by the high standard errors around our estimated remedies’ coefficients in some 
sub-samples. (3) Our results also indicate that the event study methodology can be applied in 
antitrust analysis and in particular in the analysis of the effects of mergers. Here, we do not 
stress the importance of looking at absolute CAARs at the announcement or decision dates, 
but rather the need of analyzing the relation between announcement and decision CAARs, 
which gives us a much more powerful test of the effects of the antitrust authority’s decision. 
The fact that we get a coefficient not statistically different from minus one for the sub-sample 
of blocking decisions is a robustness check in itself and a benchmark for the effectiveness of 
other types of remedies. 
 We now go into further detail by analyzing phase 1 and phase 2 decisions (sub-
samples) separately in panel B and panel C of table 4 respectively. This analysis provides 
very useful new insights. For the 81 final phase 1 decisions, rivals lose if anticompetitive 
mergers are not cleared outright, which is consistent with the notion that the Commission’s 
action is effective.31 Rivals win if pro-competitive mergers are levied with an action, and in 
this case merging firms experience a profit loss. This is exactly what we expect by the design 
of our regressions if remedies present a rent transfer between merging and rival firms. 
Distinguishing between divestitures and other remedies, does not unearth significant 
differences. Instead, splitting by the dichotomy anti- versus pro-competitive mergers yields 
particularly interesting and reassuring results: if remedies are imposed on anticompetitive 
mergers in phase 1, they are effective. The b-coefficients are between -0.5 (divestitures, not 
significant) and -0.6 (other remedies, significant) and both coefficients are not statistically 
significantly different from -1 at the 10% level. Again, wrongly imposing remedies in pro-
competitive mergers constitutes a rent transfer from merging firms to the rivals but only for 
behavioral remedies. The only puzzling result in panel B of table 4 is the positive and 
significant coefficient for rival firms in the sub-sample of pro-competitive mergers that were 
cleared without remedies. Maybe these mergers and decisions signal good future prospects for 
M&A activity in this industry without interference by antitrust authorities (i.e. the information 
revelation hypothesis proposed by Eckbo and Wier, 1985). 
 Panel C in table 4 estimates all regressions for the sub-sample of mergers that were 
decided upon in phase 2 (76). Here, as expected, the most striking feature is the negative and 
significant coefficient on blockings. This is again not statistically different from minus one for 
both merger’s insider and rival firms: both firms lose on average their rents due to this 
                                                 
31 Notice that the only action that the authority can take in phase 1 is to impose remedies. No blocking decisions 
can be made at this stage before an in depth (phase 2) investigation. 
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decision. Divestitures do not solve the anticompetitive problem. On the contrary, they 
increase rivals’ profitability when imposed in anticompetitive mergers, hence constituting a 
rent transfer from merging firms to competitors. Also behavioral (other) remedies show on 
average this “perverse” effect significantly increasing rivals’ profitability, yet only when 
applied to pro-competitive mergers. 
  To summarize, remedies seem to work in phase 1 when correctly applied, while they 
seem to be ineffective in phase 2.32 Particularly, remedies in phase 2 represent on average a 
rent transfer to the rivals. Finally, behavioral remedies that are wrongly applied, i.e. used in 
pro-competitive mergers, constitute a rent transfer from insiders to competitors both in phase 
1 and phase 2. 
 
6.2. Robustness 
6.2.1. Different Sub-samples 
We have already mentioned that one "robustness test" for the validity of our methodology is 
the coefficient of minus one on announcement CAARs for blocked mergers, which we 
actually obtain. Panel A of Table 5 presents additional robustness checks by splitting the 
sample into profitable (i.e. insider announcement CAARs are positive) versus unprofitable 
(i.e. insider announcement CAARs are negative) mergers. We would expect that our tests are 
most appropriate for profitable mergers, since motives behind unprofitable mergers may differ 
(e.g. they may be undertaken for managerial discretion reasons, see Gugler et al., 2003). All 
our results carry over. The coefficient on blocked anticompetitive mergers is negative and 
significant in the rivals’ regression and not significantly different from minus one. Other 
remedies still do not solve the anticompetitive problems on average. 
 
[table 5 about here] 
 
 While no predictions are possible if merging firms' announcement CAARs are 
negative using standard IO models assuming profit maximization, it is an empirical fact that 
unprofitable mergers happen. If merging firms should not have merged from a corporate 
                                                 
32 This apparently anomalous result is however in line with the findings by the DG Comp (2005) study on 
remedies. Indeed, the Commission’s practice is to require that remedies proposed in phase 1 be clear-cut and 
straightforward. Hence, they tend to be more far-reaching and effective than remedies applied in phase 2. In fact, 
one of the main findings of the Commission’s study is that “more phase 1 remedies have been effective as 
opposed to phase 2 remedies[…] [and] more phase 2 remedies have been “partially effective” when compared to 
phase 1 remedies.” 
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governance perspective, a side effect of an antitrust action - in particular a blocking - by the 
Commission may be to increase the merging firms’ abnormal returns for the benefit of 
shareholders. This is what we observe for blocked unprofitable mergers: the market welcomes 
these blocking decisions with a share price rally.  
Panel B of table 5 splits the sample into mergers with conglomerate/vertical effects 
and those with pure horizontal effects.33 Our tests should suit pure horizontal mergers best: 
rents due to market power are best achieved by horizontal effects. Moreover, our sign 
predictions change for e.g. vertical foreclosure mergers: the rents gained by merging firms 
due to e.g. excluding rivals stem from the rival firms, thus while merging firms win rival 
firms lose. Due to the small number of observations in the sub-sample conglomerate/vertical 
mergers, we concentrate on pure horizontal mergers. For this sub-sample, all our results carry 
over with comparable significance levels. 
 Some of our sub-samples suffer from a rather small number of observations, thus 
Panel C estimates by robust regression techniques using STATA command rreg, which 
essentially weights down extreme observations. Using robust regression techniques, however, 
leaves our main results unaltered. 
 
6.2.2. Correcting for Market Expectations 
In this section we shall present the two steps of the regression where we correct for market 
expectation about the authority’s action. In the first step we estimate the probability of a 
particular action (clearance and remedies) and in the second stage we correct our measures for 
the mergers’ and decisions’ profitability effects as highlighted in section 4.4. 
  In table 6 we report the results of the logit estimation for clearance and actions. 
Clearances (dummy equal to 0 in the case of blocking and equal to 1 in the case of clearance) 
and action (dummy equal to 0 in the case of outright clearance and equal to 1 in the case of 
remedies or blocking decisions) are explained by the following observables proxying for the 
likely (anti-) competitive effects of the mergers, lobbying and/or protectionist tendencies: 
whether one or both of the merging firms stem from the USA (us), whether one or both of the 
merging firms stem from a big EU country (bigeu; France, Germany, Italy, Spain, or UK), 
whether conglomerate or vertical effects are also present (conglom), whether the merger is a 
cross border deal (crossbord), whether the EU Commission defines the relevant geographic 
market as worldwide (world), EU wide (eu) or national (reference group), whether the merger 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that all analyzed mergers have horizontal effects, but some have in addition conglomerate or 
vertical effects 
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is a full merger (full; as opposed to partial acquisitions), the size of merging and rival firms 
measured by the logarithm of market values (lnvm and lnvr), industry indicators (d for 
manufacturing as opposed to services; and i for communications) and time variables (time 
trend and a dummy for the late years 1995-2002). Notice that all these variables are also 
observable to the market when assessing the merger’s and decision’s effects. 
 
[table 6 about here] 
 
The probability of clearing a merger is significantly higher if one or both of the 
merging firms stem from the USA, and it is lower if besides horizontal also conglomerate or 
vertical concerns are identified by the Commission. All other variables are not significant, 
although some of them have the expected sign, like the negative coefficients on cross border 
deals or the wider than national market definitions. The probability of an action is 
significantly lower if one or both of the merging firms stem from the USA34 or if markets are 
defined as either world or EU-wide; this probability increases when also conglomerate or 
vertical concerns are present, if rival firms are larger on average, and in the last years of the 
sample. 
 From the reported estimation, we predict for each merger the probability of a 
clearance and an action, which measure the ex-ante market’s expectation about these 
Commission’s decisions [ ]Aj Ilearc Pr  and [ ]Aj Iaction Pr  respectively. We next correct the 
estimated CAARs around the merger’s and decision’s announcement by the predicted 
probabilities according to the discussion highlighted above. Finally, we run the same set of 
regressions as in table 4 but using the probability corrected measures ( *Aij∆Π  and *Dij∆Π ) 
instead of the original ones ( Aij∆Π  and Dij∆Π  respectively). 
Panel A of table 7 presents the regression results using these corrected CAARs and the 
entire sample. Results are qualitatively very similar and in most cases even stronger than 
using the “uncorrected” values. Remedies, also including blockings, have significant effects: 
they reduce rivals’ profitability in anticompetitive mergers while increasing it if wrongly 
applied to pro-competitive mergers. In the latter case, insiders lose. Hence remedies can again 
be seen as a rent transfer from merging firms to competitors. When we look more in detail at 
the different decisions, it becomes evident that blockings are responsible for the profit-
                                                 
34 Note that this result differs from what is found by Atkas et al. (2004), who claim that EU merger control is 
protectionist and favours European firms. 
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reversion effect, as we previously saw. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient bB is significantly different from minus one for rivals, whereas it is even 
significantly smaller than minus one for merging firms. This means that a blocking decision 
imposes some extra costs to the insiders in addition to the lost rents from market power or the 
efficiency gains. While divestiture does not seem to have any significant effect on both 
merging and rival firms independently of the merger’s competitive effect, behavioral 
remedies continue to merely constitute a rent transfer from merging to rival firms if wrongly 
applied to pro-competitive mergers.  
 
[table 7 about here] 
 
In panels B and C we again split the sample into phase 1 and 2 decisions. Most of the 
previous results are qualitatively confirmed, some are even reinforced. Concerning phase 1 
decisions, both divestitures and other remedies reduce rivals’ profitability when appropriately 
applied to anticompetitive mergers. They instead have the opposite (OTHERREM) or no 
(DIVESTITURE) effect when mistakenly adopted. 
Looking at phase 2 decisions (panel C), results are again quite similar to those 
presented in table 4. However, the coefficients are less precisely estimated and, therefore, they 
lose significance. Nevertheless, the two main findings obtained before are confirmed: the 
blockings of anticompetitive mergers completely dissipate rival firms’ rents (the coefficient is 
not significantly different from minus one), while remedies increase it, even though not 
significantly. Again, we notice that blocking decisions impose extra costs to merging firms by 
reducing their rents well below the pre-merger situation (the bB coefficient is -2.3). 
 
7. An Ex-Post Evaluation of Mergers 
In this section, we present additional robustness checks on the results obtained so far using the 
methodology of Gugler et al. (2003) to predict the profit effects of the merger. This method 
compares actual post merger (e.g. two years as we do here) balance sheet profit levels with 
predicted profit levels in the absence of the merger. Our counterfactual is the development of 
profits and total assets in the same 3-digit industry as the merging firms or their rivals operate. 
We used a number of other counterfactuals, such as similar size or geographical regions but 
none changed our results significantly. We define ΠGt+n as the (balance sheet) profits of the 
acquiring company in year t+n, ΠDt as the profits of the acquired company in the year t, 
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predicted
Mt n+Π  as the predicted profits of the merged company in year t+n, ΠIGt+n as the profits of 
the median firm in the same 3-digit industry of the acquiring company in year t+n, ΠIDt+n as 
the profits of the median firm in the same 3-digit industry of the acquired company in year 
t+n, KGt+n as the assets of the acquiring company in year t+n, KDt as the assets of the acquired 
company in year t, KIGt+n as the assets of the median firm in the same 3-digit industry of the 
acquiring company in year t+n, and KIDt+n as the assets of median firm in the same 3-digit 
industry of the acquired company in year t+n. 
 We can now compute the projected change (∆IG t-1,t+n ) in the returns on the acquirer’s 
assets from year t-1 to t+n using again the changes observed for the median (in terms of 
profitability) company in its industry: 
 .
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If the median firm in the acquirer’s industry earned a 0.10 return on assets in t-1, and a 
0.11 return in t+n, then we would predict that the acquiring firm’s returns on assets would 
increase by 0.01 in the absence of the merger. 
Defining ∆ID t,t+n for the acquired firm’s industry analogously to ∆IG t-1,t+n gives us the 
following formula for predicting the profits of the combined company in the year t+n. 
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 The profits of the merged company in year t+n are predicted to be the profits of the 
acquirer in t-1, plus the predicted growth in its profits from t-1 to t+n, plus the profits of the 
acquired firm in t, plus the predicted growth in its profits from t to t+n in the absence of the 
merger. Analogously we can compute predicted profits for rival firms in the absence of the 
merger.  
 Our measure to evaluate the effects of the merger is then the difference between actual 
(observed) profits in year t+n and the predicted profits: 
 
( )effect actual predicted
Mt n Mt n Mt n+ + +∆Π = Π − Π . (6) 
 
 Exactly the same logic can be applied for the rivals. In fact, antitrust markets are 
different than industries based on SIC codes. The advantage of our database is that we have 
information on the real rivals to the merging firms. These firms are not a good counterfactual 
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to the merging firms, since they are also influenced by the merger as the merging firms. 
However, the rest of the industry should not be affected so strongly by the merger and this 
makes the 3-digit SIC code a good counterfactual for the merger. We can hence get a measure 
of the merger induced profit effect for rivals, which is something novel in the literature.  
[table 8 about here] 
 
 Table 8 relates the ex post profit effects from (6) for n = 2 years (and divided by the 
sum of the total assets of merging and rival firms, respectively, in year t-1 relative to the 
merger) to the announcement CAARs and the total CAARs of the merger, which is the sum of 
CAARs around announcement and decision. For both measures the relation is significantly 
positive. This assures us that (1) stock markets - at least partially - foresee the eventual profit 
effects of the merger and (2) both methodologies measure the true merger’s effects. 
 
[table 9 about here] 
 
 Table 9 relates the profit effect for the rivals ( effectRt n+∆Π ) to the merging firms’ profit 
effect ( effectMt n+∆Π ) and interacts the former with our dummies for outright clearance, other 
remedies, divestitures, and blockings. If the merger induces both the profits of the merging 
firms and the profits of their rivals to increase, then market power is at work, since the profits 
stem from consumer surplus. While we do not find a significant relation between the two 
profit effects for cleared mergers without commitments and blockings, there is a statistically 
and economically significantly positive relation for those mergers that were cleared with 
commitments. This is additional evidence for our earlier findings using an event study 
methodology that remedies do not solve the anticompetitive problems on average. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This is the first paper to econometrically analyze the effects of merger control decisions of 
one of the world’s most important antitrust agencies, the EU Commission. While this is a 
formidable task and wrecked with several difficulties, we are very cautious in isolating the 
true effects of the antitrust decisions: we do not only employ standard event study techniques 
but also conduct an ex post analysis using balance sheet data on firms’ profits and assets. We 
take great care in accounting for information leakage prior to major events, and we adjust for 
possible priors the market already had priced in at the event day. We apply a novel 
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methodology relating abnormal returns at the two major event dates, the merger’s 
announcement and antitrust decision, and obtain several testable hypotheses. By means of 
regression analysis, we test these predictions. Moreover, our dataset is as “clean” as possible 
in identifying major rivals of merging firms, since our source of information are the decisions 
of the European Commission itself. Thus we believe that our results are robust. 
 We find that only the outright blockings of supposedly anticompetitive mergers 
completely solve the anticompetitive concerns raised by the EU Commission. Only in this 
case, do we statistically get the complete dissipation of anticompetitive rents that the market 
believes will result from the merger between its announcement and the final antitrust decision. 
Other remedies, such as behavioral remedies but also divestitures, do not achieve this, on 
average. This is particularly true when remedies are applied after the Commission’s in-depth 
investigation, while they seem to be effective when applied to the “right”, anticompetitive, 
mergers during phase 1. Remedies, either because wrongly applied or wrongly designed, 
often merely result in wealth transfers from merging firms to their rivals, without solving the 
anticompetitive concerns. Our findings are thus consistent with potential problems of 
remedies such as information asymmetry and incentive problems, and the increased 
possibility of pro-collusive effects as pointed out in the theoretical literature. 
 In recent years the EU Commission - in contrast to the US antitrust authorities - 
increasingly hesitates to block mergers after the European Court of Justice overruled several 
blocking decisions. Our results imply that this may lead to the clearance of too many 
anticompetitive mergers with ineffective remedies. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Merger Control Interventions in Different Jurisdictions: USA and EU 
 
 
 
USA EU 
 
Note: rem_not = remedies divided by notifications; prev_not = preventions divided by notifications 
 
 
Figure 2: The EU Merger Control Process 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Different Events 
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Table 1: Possible Effects of Mergers on Merging (M) and Rival (R) Firms’ Profits and 
the Optimal Incidence of Remedies 
 0M∆Π >  0M∆Π <  
0R∆Π >  
Market Power Increase; 
Action 
Efficiency Reduction; 
Possibly Action (if 0I∆Π > ) 
0R∆Π <  
Efficiency Increase; 
No Action 
Efficiency Reduction; 
No Action 
 
 
 
Table 2. Preliminary Statistics 
Description Obs Mean Min Max 
Market value merging firms in million US $ 159 44165 10.8 607975 
Market value of rivals (average) in million US $ 156 7492 3.6 227604 
Number of competitors listed in the Commission report 163 7.59 1 34 
Percentange of Competitors listed 163 0.63 0 1 
Full acquisition 168 0.57 0 1 
Partial acquisition 168 0.13 0 1 
Joint Venture 168 0.24 0 1 
Asset acquisition 168 0.06 0 1 
Tender offer 168 0.11 0 1 
The merger was cleared in phase 1 168 0.53 0 1 
The geographical market is national 168 0.35 0 1 
The geographical market is the European Economic Area 168 0.41 0 1 
The geographical market is worldwide 168 0.21 0 1 
An action (remedies or blocking) have been taken 168 0.43 0 1 
The merger was prohibited 168 0.08 0 1 
The remedy consisted in a divestiture 166 0.23 0 1 
Other kinds of remedies 166 0.11 0 1 
The remedy consisted in selling shares 166 0.10 0 1 
The remedy consisted in dissolving interlocking directorates 166 0.04 0 1 
The remedy consisted in eliminating exclusive agreements 166 0.07 0 1 
Merging firms must license some products / processes 166 0.11 0 1 
Merging firms must guarantee access to an essential technology/ facility 166 0.10 0 1 
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Table 3: Abnormal Returns to Merging Firms and Their Rivals for Various Events, 
Windows and Decisions 
  Merging firms Rivals 
    Short run Long run  Short run Long run 
  Nobs CAR5_5 S.E. CAR50_5 S.E. Nobs CAR5_5 St.Err. CAR50_5 St.Err.
At announcement day of the merger:            
(Later) cleared in phase 1 74    0.010 0.009  0.021* 0.016 77   0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.011
(Later) cleared with remedies in phase 1 10   -0.014 0.022  0.019 0.061 10  -0.010 0.015 -0.009 0.045
(Later) going to phase 2 73    0.014** 0.007  0.013 0.014 78  -0.006* 0.004  0.010 0.012
(Later) cleared in phase 2 16    0.010 0.010  0.014 0.021 17  -0.007 0.013  0.005 0.025
(Later) cleared with remedies in phase 2 44    0.019 ** 0.009  0.023 0.019. 48  -0.005 0.004  0.004 0.014
(Later) blocked 13    0.001 0.018 -0.019 0.033 13  -0.009 0.011  0.035 0.040
            
All 157    0.010** 0.005  0.018 ** 0.010 165  -0.003 0.003  0.004 0.008
             
At phase 1 decision day of the merger: Nobs CAR5_5 St.Err. CAR25_5 St.Err. Nobs CAR5_5 St.Err. CAR25_5 St.Err.
Cleared in phase 1 74  -0.002 0.007  0.003 0.010 77  -0.002 0.005  0.008 0.009
Cleared with remedies in phase 1 10    0.013 0.024 -0.007 0.033 10  -0.035* 0.020  0.032 0.066
Going to phase 2 73  -0.017*** 0.006 -0.014** 0.008 78  -0.0001 0.005 -0.011 0.009
(Later) cleared in phase 2 16  -0.023** 0.009 -0.017 0.020 17   0.003 0.010 -0.008 0.027
(Later) cleared with remedies in phase 2 44  -0.011* 0.007 -0.013 0.010 48  -0.003 0.008 -0.006 0.011
(Later) blocked 13  -0.029 0.027 -0.017 0.017 13   0.003 0.009 -0.035* 0.023
            
All 157  -0.008** 0.004 -0.005 0.006 165  -0.003 0.003  0.000 0.007
            
At phase 2 decision day of the merger: Nobs CAR5_5 St.Err. CAR50_5 St.Err. Nobs CAR5_5 St.Err. CAR50_5 St.Err.
Cleared in phase 2 16    0.018 0.019  0.066** 0.037 17   0.0001 0.010  0.001 0.022
Cleared with remedies in phase 2 44    0.003 0.012 -0.015 0.015 48  -0.004 0.008 -0.017 0.029
Blocked 13    0.008 0.009  0.008 0.049 13   0.025 0.025 -0.055 0.045
            
All 73    0.007 0.008 0.005 0.015 78  0.001 0.007 -0.019 0.348
 
Note: *, **, *** ... significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table 4. Regressions Results: Full Sample, Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Dependent variable: Decision 
CAAR of Rivals Merging firms 
Independent variable 
Rival/insider CAR at 
announcement interacted with: 
Nobs R2 Coeff St.Err. Nobs R2 Coeff St.Err. 
PANEL A – Full Sample 
One 157 0.095  0.110 0.095 149 0.134 -0.006 0.068 
         
CLEAR 157 0.098  0.176 0.142 149 0.149  0.084 0.089 
ACTION    0.051 0.135   -0.122 0.101 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 155 0.121 0.282 0.240 149 0.166  0.126 0.124 
CLEAR *PROCOMP   0.091 0.230    0.032 0.134 
ACTION*ANTICOMP   -0.042 0.198    0.023 0.139 
ACTION*PROCOMP    0.190 0.249   -0.285** 0.147 
         
CLEAR 155 0.216  0.190 0.132 147 0.196  0.089 0.087 
OTHERREM    0.339 0.298   -0.049 0.241 
DIVESTITURE    0.456*** 0.174   -0.006 0.124 
BLOCK   -0.687*** 0.223   -0.639*** 0.246 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 155 0.274  0.303 0.218 147 0.217  0.122 0.122 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.087 0.206    0.048 0.131 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -0.790*** 0.252   -0.523* 0.331 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.228 0.509   -0.801** 0.376 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.818*** 0.268    0.152 0.180 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP    0.097 0.257   -0.160 0.169 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP   -0.032 0.353    0.148 0.297 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    1.407** 0.592   -0.378 0.393 
         
PANEL B - Phase1 
         
CLEAR 81 0.183  0.219*** 0.075 78 0.152  0.058 0.060 
ACTION    0.070 0.175   -0.025 0.141 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 81 0.310  0.062 0.122 78 0.200  0.081 0.080 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.395*** 0.124    0.032 0.091 
ACTION*ANTICOMP   -0.455** 0.226    0.063 0.148 
ACTION*PROCOMP    0.859*** 0.289   -0.626* 0.361 
         
CLEAR 81 0.185  0.219*** 0.076 78 0.153  0.057 0.060 
OTHERREM    0.109 0.200    0.022 0.274 
DIVESTITURE   -0.029 0.301   -0.043 0.169 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 81 0.392  0.033 0.116 78 0.202  0.079 0.081 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.409*** 0.118    0.032 0.093 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP   -0.522 0.360    0.027 0.177 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP   -0.014 0.417   -0.640 0.523 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP   -0.604** 0.238    0.156 0.290 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    1.589*** 0.381   -0.582 0.530 
 41
 
PANEL C - Phase II 
        
CLEAR 76 0.197  0.141 0.431 71 0.287 -0.293 0.439 
ACTION    0.074 0.209   -0.200 0.158 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 74 0.222 0.546 0.824 71 0.291  0.038 0.829 
CLEAR *PROCOMP   -0.089 0.600   -0.424 0.535 
ACTION*ANTICOMP   0.187 0.334   -0.140 0.246 
ACTION*PROCOMP   -0.089 0.428   -0.226 0.224 
         
CLEAR 74 0.347  0.142 0.397 69 0.363 -0.309 0.427 
OTHERREM    1.137 0.797   -0.177 0.441 
DIVESTITURE    0.561** 0.258   -0.003 0.192 
BLOCK   -0.699** 0.322   -0.747** 0.329 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 74 0.409  0.268 0.766 69 0.371  0.021 0.829 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.062 0.550   -0.436 0.529 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -0.647* 0.376   -0.747* 0.470 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.780 0.898   -0.718 0.516 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    1.112*** 0.416    0.151 0.324 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP    0.022 0.406   -0.075 0.255 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP    0.366 1.048   -0.048 0.659 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    2.456* 1.421   -0.280 0.629 
Note: We perform one-way-fixed effects regressions, where the absorbing categorical factor is the year of the decision. 
We also control for industry effects and for conglomerate/foreclosure aspects. Moreover we control for the proportion of 
rivals that we lost due to data limitation. The dependent variable is the decision abnormal returns for rivals and merging 
firms respectively. The decisions are defined as follows: CLEAR: the merger is cleared without remedies; ACTION: the 
merger is either cleared with remedies or blocked; OTHERREM: the merger is cleared with remedies other than 
divestitures (mainly behavioral remedies); DIVESTITURE: the merger is cleared with a divestiture; BLOCK the merger 
is blocked. The definition of anti-and pro-competitive merger is as follow: ANTICOMP is equal to one if rivals’ 
announcement CAARs > 0; PROCOMP is equal to one if rivals’ announcement CAARs< 0. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks: Profitable vs. Unprofitable Mergers, Conglomerate vs. 
Non-conglomerate, and Robust regressions 
Dependent variable: Decision CAAR of Rivals Merging firms 
Independent variable 
Rival/insider CAR at announcement interacted with: Nobs R
2 Coeff St.Err. Nobs R2 Coeff St.Err.
PANEL A 
Profitable         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 82 0.4562  0.483** 0.229 82 0.3182  0.481 0.425 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.164 0.313    0.154 0.176 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -0.766*** 0.222   -0.322 0.793 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.262 0.573   -0.909** 0.416 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.711* 0.372    0.240 0.256 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP   -0.294 0.357   -0.071 0.211 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP   -0.040 0.295    0.302 0.429 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    1.036* 0.624   -0.805 0.744 
Unprofitable         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP  73 0.4527  0.845 0.555 65 0.5166 -0.019 0.232 
CLEAR *PROCOMP   -0.323 0.325    0.258 0.346 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -1.063 0.727   -0.454 0.372 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.386 0.918    3.079** 1.318 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.996* 0.397    0.310 0.313 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP   -0.142 0.399    0.168 0.469 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP    0.575 2.071    0.570 0.482 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    1.817 1.203    0.221 0.488 
PANEL B 
Conglomerate         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 23 0.6631   21 0.9088   
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.323 0.316    0.9175 0.325 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -1.037 0.826   -0.452 0.587 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.677 0.763     
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.715** 0.313    0.250 0.525 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP    0.677 0.899   -1.597 1.216 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP   -0.299 0.473   -0.201 0.530 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    5.374 6.530    0.443 0.517 
Non Conglomerate         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 132 0.2379  0.212 0.234 126 0.2192  0.100 0.130 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.105 0.273   -0.038 0.170 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -0.797*** 0.271   -0.514 0.416 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.119 0.619   -0.779** 0.391 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.576 0.424    0.094 0.210 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP    0.0967 0.275   -0.161 0.178 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP    0.066 0.578    0.041 0.497 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    1.463** 0.629   -0.343 0.413 
PANEL C 
Robust regressions         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 155   0.395*** 0.129 146   0.105 0.107 
CLEAR *PROCOMP   -0.046 0.121    0.069 0.116 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -0.980*** 0.149   -0.022 0.292 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -0.412 0.301    2.016* 1.081 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    1.380*** 0.158    0.129 0.158 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP   -0.322** 0.152   -0.616*** 0.149 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP    0.028 0.209    0.120 0.262 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    0.530 0.350   -0.339 0.346 
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Note: We perform one-way-fixed effects regressions by means of the areg command in STATA, where the absorbing 
categorical factor is the year of the decision. We also control for industry effects and for conglomerate/foreclosure 
aspects. Moreover we control for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. The dependent variable is 
the decision abnormal returns for rivals and merging firms respectively. The decisions are defined as follows: CLEAR: 
the merger is cleared without remedies; ACTION: the merger is either cleared with remedies or blocked; 
OTHERREM: the merger is cleared with remedies other than divestitures (mainly behavioral remedies); 
DIVESTITURE: the merger is cleared with a divestiture; BLOCK the merger is blocked. The definition of anti-and 
pro-competitive merger is as follow: ANTICOMP is equal to one if rivals’ announcement CAARs > 0; PROCOMP is 
equal to one if rivals’ announcement CAARs< 0.. (Un)Profitable mergers are defined as mergers where the merging 
firms announcement CAAR > (<) 0; Conglomerate mergers are such when the Commission identified also 
conglomerate or vertical effects; in Non-conglomerate mergers the Commission identified only horizontal effects; 
Robust regressions uses STATA command rreg. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% 
respectively  
 
 
Table 6: The Probability of Clearance and Remedies: Logit regressions 
 Dep. Var: CLEAR Dep. Var: ACTION 
 Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
     
us   3.078* 1.609    -1.314** 0.540 
Bigeu 0.486 1.009 -0.419 0.480 
conglom    -0.573** 0.883   0.955* 0.568 
crossbord 1.921 0.743 -0.476 0.459 
world -0.408 0.859   -0.418* 0.519 
eu -0.158 0.887   -0.844* 0.482 
full -0.136 0.790 0.781 0.421 
lnvm -0.262 0.297 0.121 0.165 
lnvr -0.055 0.254     0.183** 0.151 
d -0.296 0.974 1.034 0.508 
i -1.347 1.089 0.673 0.637 
trend 0.870 1.122 -0.949 0.611 
d95_02 -1.281 1.643    1.729* 0.921 
constant 3.486 2.998 -2.452 1.688 
     
Nobs 154 154 
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.156 
Log-likelihood -35.79 -88.80 
Note: We perform probit regression given the categorical nature of the dependent 
variables. The Dependent variables are CLEAR equal to 1 if the merger was cleared 
with or without remedies and ACTION equal to 1 of the merger was cleared with 
remedies or blocked. The control variables are: us equal to 1 if one of the merging 
firms stems from the USA; bigeu equal to 1 if one of the merging firms stem from a 
big EU country (Germany, France, UK or Italy); conglom equal to 1 if conglomerate 
or vertical effects are also present;  cross equal to 1 if the merger is a cross border 
deal; world equal to 1 if the EU Commission defines the relevant geographic market 
worldwide; eu equal to 1 if relevant market EU wide; full equal to 1 if the merger is a 
full merger; lnvm and lnvr are respectively the size of merging and rival firms 
measured by the logarithm of market values; d equal to  1 if manufacturing sector; i 
equal to 1 if communications sector; trend represents a time trend; d95_02 equal to 1 
if the merger was scrutinized during 1995-2002. The symbols *, **, *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively  
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Table 7: Regression Results: Correcting for the Probability of Clearance and Remedies. 
Dependent variable: Decision 
CAAR of Rivals Merging firms 
Independent variable 
Rival/insider effective CAAR at 
announcement interacted with: 
Nobs R2 Coeff St.Err. Nobs R2 Coeff St.Err. 
PANEL A – Full Sample 
One 149 0.1029  0.034 0.176 149 0.1335 -0.229 0.153 
         
CLEAR 149 0.1141  0.325 0.285 149 0.1791  0.1532 0.206 
ACTION   -0.155 0.229   -0.640*** 0.214 
         
CLEAR*ANTICOMP 149 0.1855 -0.005 0.287 149 0.1851  0.164 0.301 
CLEAR*PROCOMP   -0.290 0.280    0.137 0.293 
ACTION*ANTICOMP   -0.918** 0.319   -0.428 0.306 
ACTION*PROCOMP    0.859** 0.373   -0.849*** 0.302 
         
CLEAR 149 0.2644  0.328 0.262 147 0.2792  0.1592 0.195 
OTHERREM    1.233*** 0.454   -0.542 0.446 
DIVESTITURE    0.449 0.359   -0.103 0.273 
BLOCK   -1.272*** 0.319   -2.225*** 0.455 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 149 0.3075  0.524 0.442 147 0.2917  0.138 0.287 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.208 0.405    0.178 0.279 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -1.326*** 0.349   -2.003*** 0.647 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -1.122 0.912   -2.494*** 0.661 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.373 0.699    0.022 0.401 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP    0.443 0.451   -0.244 0.369 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP   -0.116 0.692    0.021 0.620 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    2.401*** 0.646   -1.086* 0.610 
         
PANEL B – Phase1 
         
CLEAR 78 0.4079  0.427*** 0.162 78 0.1614  0.036 0.128 
ACTION    1.336*** 0.279   -0.324 0.277 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 78 0.5696  0.120 0.134 78 0.2848  0.032 0.170 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.315** 0.137    0.045 0.174 
ACTION*ANTICOMP   -0.702* 0.490    0.218 0.312 
ACTION*PROCOMP    2.414*** 0.324   -1.361*** 0.420 
         
CLEAR 78 0.4203  0.421** 0.162 78 0.1710  0.038 0.128 
OTHERREM    1.435*** 0.292   -0.587 0.423 
DIVESTITURE    0.332 0.934   -0.111 0.379 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 78 0.6935  0.086 0.212 78 0.2909  0.027 0.173 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.805*** 0.208    0.047 0.176 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP   -1.640 1.586    0.083 0.383 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP   -0.053 0.800   -1.626 1.058 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP   -1.202*** 0.432    0.532 0.575 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    2.940*** 0.305   -1.265* 0.476 
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PANEL C – Phase 2 
        
CLEAR 71 0.2230  0.114 0.874 71 0.2832 -0.341 1.067 
ACTION   -0.316 0.351   -0.817** 0.347 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 71 0.2436 -0.144 1.963 71  -0.025 2.060 
CLEAR *PROCOMP   -0.009 1.246   -0.485 1.293 
ACTION*ANTICOMP   -0.756 0.510   -0.923* 0.526 
ACTION*PROCOMP    0.356 0.663   -0.701 0.502 
         
CLEAR 71 0.3395  0.1345 0.829 71 0.4134 -0.372 1.004 
OTHERREM    1.374 1.552   -0.800 0.952 
DIVESTITURE    0.655 0.520   -0.078 0.426 
BLOCK   -1.142** 0.465   -2.351*** 0.622 
         
CLEAR *ANTICOMP 71 0.3497  0.470 1.698 71 0.4146 -0.011 1.994 
CLEAR *PROCOMP    0.023 1.232   -0.520 1.241 
BLOCK*ANTICOMP   -1.015* 0.546   -2.344** 0.940 
BLOCK*PROCOMP   -2.067 1.744   -2.317** 0.937 
DIVESTITURE*ANTICOMP    0.984 1.139   -0.147 0.714 
DIVESTITURE*PROCOMP    0.501 0.724   -0.016 0.574 
OTHERREM*ANTICOMP    0.846 2.176   -0.674 1.323 
OTHERREM*PROCOMP    2.591 3.063   -0.973 1.458 
Note: We perform one-way-fixed effects regressions by means of the areg command in STATA, where the absorbing 
categorical factor is the year of the decision.  We also control for industry effects and for conglomerate/foreclosure 
aspects. Moreover we control for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. The dependent variable is 
the decision abnormal returns for rivals and merging firms respectively divided by the probability of clearance. The 
announcement CAARs are divided by one minus the probability of remedies. This variable is interacted with the 
decisions that are defined as follows: CLEAR: the merger is cleared without remedies; ACTION: the merger is either 
cleared with remedies or blocked; OTHERREM: the merger is cleared with remedies other than divestitures (mainly 
behavioral remedies); DIVESTITURE: the merger is cleared with a divestiture; BLOCK the merger is blocked. The 
definition of anti-and pro-competitive merger is as follow: ANTICOMP is equal to one if rivals’ announcement CAARs 
> 0; PROCOMP is equal to one if rivals’ announcement CAARs< 0. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 8. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Profit Effects 
 
 
Rivals 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Effect 
Announcement CAAR+Decision CAAR 
 
 
Announcement CAAR 
 
Independent variables: Nobs R2 Coef. Std. Err. R2 Coef. Std. Err. 
        
Rivals' profit effect 2 years after 
the merger 105 0.1185 0.077*** 0.026 0.1485 0.067*** 0.018 
        
 
 
Merging Firms 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Effect 
Announcement CAAR+Decision CAAR  
 
 
Announcement CAAR 
 
Independent variables: Nobs R2 Coef. Std. Err. R2 Coef. Std. Err. 
        
Merging firms' profit effect 2 
years after the merger 94 0.1959 0.169 0.148 0.1960 0.218** 0.116 
        
Note: We perform robust regressions by means of the rreg command in STATA to account for the role of outliers. 
The dependent variables are the announcement CAARs and the sum of the announcement and the decision CAARs 
for the rivals and merging firms respectively. The main explanatory variable is the profit effect two years after the 
merger measured by means of balance sheet data. We control for time and industry dummies in all regressions. The 
symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
 
 
Table 9. The Relationship between Merging Firms’ and Rivals’ Profit Effects 
Dependent Variable: 
Merging firms' profit effect 2 
years after the merger 
Independent variables:  
 Coef. Std. Err. 
Rivals' profit effect 2 years after the merger* CLEAR         0.089 0.108 
Rivals' profit effect 2 years after the merger* OTHER REMEDIES      0.816*** 0.216 
Rivals' profit effect 2 years after the merger* DIVESTITURE      1.849*** 0.089 
Rivals' profit effect 2 years after the merger* BLOCK 0.347 0.893 
  
Nobs 87 
R2 0.1938 
Note: We perform robust regressions by means of the rreg command in STATA to account for the role of 
outliers. The dependent variable is the profit effect two years after the merger measured by means of balance 
sheet data for the merging firm. The main explanatory variable is the same measure for the rivals that is 
interacted with the Commission’s decision defined as follows: CLEAR: the merger is cleared; OTHERREM: 
the merger is cleared with remedies other than divestiture (mainly behavioral remedies); DIVESTITURE: the 
merger is cleared with a divestiture; BLOCK the merger is blocked.. We control for time and industry dummies 
in all regressions. The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
